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Abstract 
 
Gender inequality is an acute and persistent problem, especially in developing 
countries. This paper argues that gender discrimination is an inefficient practice. We 
model gender discrimination as the complete exclusion of females from the labor market 
or as the exclusion of females from managerial positions. The distortions in the 
allocation of talent between managerial and unskilled positions, and in human capital 
investment, are analyzed. It is found that both types of discrimination lower economic 
growth; and that the former also implies a reduction in per capita GDP, while the latter 
distorts the allocation of talent. Both types of discrimination imply lower female-to-male 
schooling ratios. We discuss the sustainability of social norms or stigma that can 
generate discrimination in the form described in this paper. We present evidence based 
on panel-data regressions across Indian states over 1961-1991 that is consistent with 
the model’s predictions. 
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“Woman’s participation in employment outside the home is viewed as inappropriate, subtly 
wrong, and definitely dangerous to their chastity and womanly virtue. When a family 
recovers from an economic crisis or attempts to improve its status, women may be kept at 
home as a demonstration of the family’s morality and as a symbol of its financial security. 
(…) Well-off and better-educated families may send their daughters to school, but are able 
to afford the cultural practice of keeping women at home after schooling is complete.” 
[“Women and the Economy in India”] 
 
“In terms of skill development, women are impeded by their lack of mobility, low literacy 
levels and prejudiced attitudes toward women. When women negotiate with banks and 
government officials, they are often ostracized by other men and women in their community 
(…).  Government and bank officials have preconceived ideas of what women are capable 
of, and stereotypes of what is considered women’s work.” 
 [“Chronic Hunger and the Status of Women in India”] 
 
“There is a popular notion among many employers who feel that the men have a greater 
responsibility in supporting the family than the women and therefore have a greater right to 
the job.” 
[“Report of the Survey of Women Workers’ Working Conditions in Industry”] 
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I. Introduction 
Gender discrimination against women in the market place reduces the available talent in 
an economy, which has negative economic consequences. Gender discrimination takes 
many forms. Many social practices seen as normal from a religious or cultural point of 
view (which may have deep historical roots) leave women out of the economic 
mainstream.  These social practices may have profound economic consequences because 
they do not allow society to take advantage of the talent inherent in women. This paper 
investigates these economic consequences. Although gender discrimination may have a 
myriad of other important consequences, including psychological, sociological, and 
religious, these are not discussed in this paper. 
 
We develop a theoretical model that allows us to explore the economic implications of 
gender discrimination in the labor market. In the model, individuals are born with a 
given endowment of entrepreneurial talent and decide how much human capital to 
acquire, and whether to become managers or workers. Individuals can also engage in 
home production. Their choices depend on what everyone else is doing, because other 
people’s decisions affect the returns to investment in human capital and the relative 
returns to becoming a manager or a worker. We study three possible scenarios. First, we 
analyze the labor market equilibrium without discrimination. Second, we model gender 
discrimination as an exogenous exclusion of females from managerial positions. Our 
model shows how this discriminatory practice affects the labor market, the equilibrium 
wage rate, the allocation of talent across working and managerial positions, the 
investment in education by individuals (males and females), and economic growth. We 
show that discrimination tends to lower equilibrium wages for female and male workers, 
and to reduce investment in human capital by all females and by male workers. We also 
show that the average talent of managers is smaller in case of discrimination, which 
accounts for reduced innovation in the economy, and that the average productivity of 
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workers, which accounts for technology adoption in the economy, is reduced too. Both 
factors lower economic growth. The fact that the relative average earnings of females 
relative to males are lower due to occupational segregation matches empirical evidence 
about the gender wage gap.1 
 
Third, we model gender discrimination as a complete exclusion of females from the 
labor market. That is, women can only engage in home production. In this case, the 
equilibrium wage rate—and, hence, the average talent and productivity—is the same as 
in the case of no discrimination. Nevertheless, this type of discrimination is inefficient, 
because per capita GDP is lower than without discrimination, as home production 
productivity is lower than that of production outside the home  Economic growth is also 
lower because, even if the innovation and adoption dimensions are not affected, females 
optimally decide not to invest in human capital. Finally, we discuss why discrimination 
in the labor market of either type can be sustainable. In particular, the reason that gender 
discrimination in either managerial positions only or the overall labor market persists 
may be the existence of substantial transaction costs in marital bargaining, as is argued 
in the context of noncooperative (separate spheres) bargaining in the marriage market. 
 
While gender discrimination against women in the labor market in developed countries 
is usually identified with differential wage rates, it is in developing countries that this 
discrimination appears to take the form of differential access to wage employment 
(Collier (1994)). To test the implications of the model we take the particular case of 
India. This is a relevant case for the current study since cultural reasons are there (as in 
many other countries) known to restrict women’s access to work (Kumar et al. (1999)). 
                                                 
1 Treiman and Hartman (1981) for instance using U.S. Census data estimated that as much as 35% of the pay gap 
was explained by occupational segregation.  For more on occupational gender segregation, see Preston (1999), 
Reskin and Roos (1990), and Strober (1984). 
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The existence of a great variability in gender sensitivity and customs among Indian 
states makes it suitable for the sort of econometric analysis that we pursue. Regions in 
northern India (which tends to be more patriarchal and feudal) have lower female labor 
force participation rates than southern regions (where generally women have relatively 
more freedom and a more prominent presence in society). Although the cultural 
restrictions women face are changing, women are not still as free as men to participate in 
the formal economy (Drèze and Sen (1995), Dunlop and Velkoff (1999), Nihila (1999)).  
 
In order to make use of the variability over time among states, we then use panel data 
from sixteen Indian states over 1961-1991. We find that, as predicted by the model, the 
ratio of female-to-male managers and the ratio of female-to-male total workers are 
positively and statistically significantly related to total output per capita. Specifically, an 
increase of 10 percent in the female-to-male ratio of managers would increase per capita 
total output by 2 percent, while an increase of 10 percent in the female-to-male ratio of 
total workers would increase per capita total output by 8 percent. Our regressions control 
for female and male literacy rates, socioeconomic controls, political controls, and state 
and year fixed effects.  Robustness is checked controlling for potential endogeneity of 
the gender composition of the labor force by using the ratio of prosecutions launched to 
the number of complaints received under the Maternity Benefits Act (1961) as 
instrumental variable. We also find that the negative effects of gender discrimination are 
more serious for particular sectors of the economy like the non-agricultural sector. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we discuss some background 
information. Section III presents some related literature. Section IV contains the model. 
Section V turns to the empirical evidence, and Section VI concludes and discusses some 
policy implications. 
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II. Women and the Labour Market in India: Some Background  
Female labor participation in India figures are still low: 22 percent according to the 
Census of India of 1991, and 28 percent according to the National Sample Survey 
(Kundu (1999)). The definition of economic activity used by both the Census and the 
National Sample Survey is somewhat restrictive, even though it takes into account 
involvement in some household enterprises such as farm activities or small-scale artisan 
production or transacted service provision. 
 
The evolution of female labor force participation rates in modern India has differed by 
state. Furthermore, female labor participation in India was lower in 1991 than in 1901-
1951, when the participation rate ranged between 28 and 34 percent. While women in 
the middle classes do not tend to participate in the labor force, women from poorer 
households cannot afford to not engage in productive activity outside the home. 
However, women in the upper classes are increasingly free to participate in the labor 
force, especially in the cities.2 This suggests the existence of a U-shaped relationship 
between female labor participation and development as documented in Goldin (1994), 
who argues that the initial decline in female participation is because of an income 
effect—due to the change from home production to manual work market production, 
against which a social stigma (what in this paper we call social norm) exists—while, as 
economies develop, women enter the labor force through white-collar work, against 
which no social stigma exists.3 Therefore female labor force participation in India is 
most likely the result of the interaction between social norms (enforced by social stigma 
                                                 
2 In India, not until women receive specialized post-secondary education do they see significant improvements in 
their employment rates (Dunlop and Velkoff (1999)). 
3 “The social stigma against wives working in paid manual labor outside the home is apparently widespread and 
strong (…). The prohibition is so ubiquitous that it seems likely to be connected with many of the most basic 
norms in society—those which bind the family together as a productive unit.” (Goldin (1994)). 
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that obliges men to provide for their families) and economic conditions: as Goldin 
(1994) shows with a simple model, the probability that the stigma will be binding will be 
greater the larger the family income. In this paper we identify the aggregate 
consequences of this so-called social stigma (or the social norm that it enforces), in not 
allowing women to participate in the labor market at certain stages of the development 
process. 
 
Figure A1 displays the female labor participation rate as a function of logged per capita 
output, by Indian state.4 Northwestern states (Bihar, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh, with the possible exception of Rajasthan, which shows a 
slightly increasing pattern) plus Assam, in the North as well, not only have lower female 
labor participation rates for a given level of development but also are the only states 
which do not display the increasing part of the U-shape relationship. That is, in these 
states, development is not easing female access to the labor market—these states are 
characterized by highly unequal gender relations (large literacy gap by gender, strictly 
restricted female property rights, strong boy preference, and neglect of female children). 
In contrast, in South India, where gender relations are less patriarchal and for instance 
female education has extended relatively rapidly (Drèze and Sen (1995)), states are in 
the increasing part of the U-shape relationship. This paper addresses the consequences of 
social norms or stigma that do not allow women to have access to the same labor market 
opportunities as men which, in India, seem to be stronger in Northwestern states.  
 
                                                 
4 The female labor force participation rate used here contains female employers, employees, single workers, and 
family workers, as a percentage of the female population aged 15 to 59 (see the data appendix for more details 
and definitions).  Examined by group, the proportions of females as both employees and employers have been 
increasing with respect to development (only slightly for Northwestern states), while the proportion of women as 
single workers has decreased. The proportion of women as family workers has changed little for most states. 
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The Government of India has tried to improve the status of women workers through 
legislation directly targeting women (Maternity Benefits Act (1961), Equal 
Remuneration Act (1976)), or indirectly (Plantations Labor Act (1951), Contract Labor 
(1970), Inter-State Migrant Workers Act (1979), Factories Act (1948), and Mines Act 
(1952)). 
 
Despite the Government’s attempts at improving women’s working conditions, 
inequalities remain. Men are more likely to get promotions than women—besides, for 
men the nature of their jobs often changed with these promotions, unlike women, who 
usually only got increased responsibility and higher workload. Promotion policies are 
better in the public sector and unionized companies (Kumar et al (1999)). However, the 
provision for facilities at the workplace is inadequate, regardless of whether the 
company is unionized. 
 
III.  Related Literature 
Even though an extensive literature tries and assesses the equity implications of gender 
inequality (e.g. the existence of unexplained inequality in wages,5 potential gender gaps 
in the intra-household allocation of goods through demand analysis6) not much has been 
said about the efficiency costs of this inequality. It is sometimes said that discrimination 
hinders economic development, but how does this happen? Some studies explore the 
empirical relationship between different forms of gender inequality and growth. Most of 
them consist of cross-country analyses that measure gender inequality in terms of 
                                                 
5 Instances are Blau (1996), Blau and Kahn (1994, 1999), Horrace and Oaxaca (2001), and Tam (1996). For the 
case of India, see Madheswaran and Lakshmanasamy (1996), who also consider how much of the gender gap 
among female and male science graduates is due to occupational segregation, and Duraisamy and Duraisamy 
(1996, 1999a, 1999b). 
6 Deaton (1989, 1997), Burgess and Zhang (2001). 
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schooling, life expectancy,7 or the gender wage gap, so that the usual problems arise (e.g. 
unobserved heterogeneity across countries). Therefore the use of panel data from Indian 
states constitutes an alternative empirical analysis that might manage to overcome these 
shortcomings—in fact, to our knowledge this is the first paper that quantifies the 
aggregate effects of gender discrimination that does not consist of a cross-country 
analysis. 
 
The type of discrimination used in this paper is related to the concept of discrimination 
on grounds of employers’ tastes, which was first used by Becker (1971), and may be 
rational in the context of religious or traditional beliefs that may operate as social norms 
in many countries.8 The concept of social norm that we use as to explain what we call 
total discrimination is related to the concept of social stigma in Goldin (1994). We 
consider discrimination as exogenous while there may certainly be a bunch of factors 
that can account for discrimination up to some degree. However, we do explore the 
sustainability of the operating social norm. We argue that inefficiencies arise due to 
distortions in the allocation of talent. The idea that distortions in the allocation of talent 
across occupations or sectors have negative growth implications is not new (Murphy et 
al. (1991), Fershtman et al. (1996)), but to our knowledge this is the first study to use it 
in order to analyze the consequences of discrimination. 
 
                                                 
7 See Dollar and Gatti (1999), Klasen (1999), Esteve-Volart (2000), Knowles et al. (2002), Seguino (2000), or 
World Bank (2001a) for a survey.  Tzannatos (1992) uses simulation and occupational data from a few Latin 
American countries to assess what would be the change in the gender composition of the labor force and in 
output were there wage equality across genders. 
8 Nirmala and Parthasarthy (1999) find that marginalisation of women workers in India has been more in low 
growth states like Bihar and Orissa than in technology-intensive areas such as Punjab.  According to the authors, 
cultural factors, more than technology, lead to women’s marginalisation in the Indian labor market. 
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We adopt a broad concept of discrimination in understanding that inequality or 
differences in the access to resources (here, the labor market) by gender are in part due to 
underlying discrimination against women.  Several studies report that in many countries 
it is more difficult for females to have access to human capital, land, and financial or 
other assets that allow them to be entrepreneurs (Blackden and Bhanu (1999), 
International Labour Organization (1995)). Even in the 30 most developed countries in 
the world, the average incidence of females among managers is less than 30 percent. For 
Africa and Asia (including Pacific countries), according to the International Labour 
Organization (1995), the rates are lower than 15 percent (data refer to 1985-95), while 
female labor activity rates figures for 1999 are as low as 9.3 percent for Oman, 10.8 
percent for Iraq, 14.5 percent for Jordan, 23.1 percent for Egypt, and 29.4 percent for 
India (World Bank (2001b)).  
 
There also exists an extensive literature that investigates a reverse relationship, i.e. how 
gender inequality changes along the development process. Some studies find the linear 
negative relationship that would be predicted by the neoclassical model, a second array 
of papers seem to find the U-shaped relationship described by Boserup (1970), in the 
same way as Kuznets (1955) established for income inequality, while finally another set 
of papers finds either no robust relationship or mixed results.9 
 
This paper can also be related to some studies that explore other types of discrimination 
or discrimination in a broad sense. Coate and Tennyson (1992) explore what happens 
when individuals belonging to a group that is discriminated against face higher interest 
rates in borrowing to enter self-employment. This statistical discrimination is not derived 
from credit market discrimination, but from labor market discrimination, which spills 
                                                 
9 See Forsythe et al. (2000) for a complete literature review and description of the different approaches. 
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over to the credit market in the context of asymmetric information regarding borrowers. 
A related hypothesis could be used to explain the form of partial discrimination that we 
use in this paper, as we explain later. 
 
Our model is based on a model by Rosen (1982), who analyzed the individual’s decision 
between becoming a manager or a worker in order to match the empirical observation 
that managers’ earnings at the highest hierarchies in large organizations are skewed to 
the right. As in that paper, we assume that 1) there are multiplicative productivity 
interactions and 2) the quality of supervision gets congested  Models where the decision 
between being a manager or a worker is given by latent talent (or alternatively, risk 
aversion) can also be found in Lucas (1978), Kanbur (1979), and Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979). 
 
IV. Model 
IV. A.  The Division Between Managers and Workers in the Labor Market 
Following Rosen (1982), we consider an economy where each firm is run by one 
manager, who employs workers. Workers, in turn, follow the directions that are given by 
the manager. In our model, however, individuals can also not participate in the labor 
market as either workers or managers but rather work in home production.10 
 
Individuals are born with a given endowment of underlying managerial talent, denoted 
by T.11 Each individual can optimally choose whether she wants to become a manager or 
a worker. Each person is described by a vector of skills (r,q,qH), where r denotes 
managerial skills, q denotes productivity as a (market) worker, and qH  denotes 
                                                 
10 Home production here refers to productive activity that could be done outside the home (at firms). 
11 This concept is similar to the notion of energy used in Becker (1985). 
 10
productivity as a home worker. The type of skill she actually utilizes is determined by 
her decision to be either a manager, a worker, or a home worker, while the other skills 
remains latent.  In our model, we also introduce the possibility of investing in human 
capital to increase the amount of skills. Also differently from Rosen (1982), talent is 
only useful for managers.12 In particular, individuals can acquire higher education and/or 
primary education. We assume that those who want to become workers acquire only 
primary education, while those who want to be managers can acquire both primary and 
higher education. An individual cannot acquire higher education without first having 
completed primary schooling. No education is assumed to be necessary for the home 
production sector. Productivity of home workers is then constant and equal to one. That 
is, individuals can decide whether to become managers, workers, or home production 
workers. If they are workers, they can study and improve their productivity over one by 
acquiring primary education; however, if they are engaged in the home production sector 
then their productivity is equal to one. We assume that skills are given by the following: 
 
,1q
H1q
HT)c1(HcTr
H
p
1
hp
=
+=
−+=
σ
β−β
   (1) 
 
with 0<β<1 and 0<σ<1, for some constant  0<c<1.  If a (market) worker does not 
invest in human capital, he has a skill equal to 1. Hj , j={p, h} denotes the level of 
primary and higher schooling acquired by individuals.  Complete primary schooling is 
denoted by pH . 
                                                 
12 In contrast, Rosen (1982) uses a broader concept of talent (ξ) and assumes that skills are given and equal to 
ξqq baq +=   and ξrr bar += , for some constants  { }rqkba kk ,,, = . 
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We assume that entrepreneurial talent at birth is distributed uniformly for males and 
females. The total population is P, one-half of which is female. The product attributable 
to a manager with r skills supervising a total quantity of labor skills 
1
jN
i
i
Q q
=
=∑  is, 
 
  ( ) ( )rY sg r f Q= ,      (2) 
 
where  f’ ≥ 0, f’’ < 0 (diminishing returns), g’ > 0, s is the current state of technology, 
which is a nonrival, nonexcludable good, and Nj denotes the amount of workers hired by 
firm j’s entrepreneur.13 
 
The form g(r) can be thought of as the analytical representation of the quality of 
management decisions, so that greater r implies greater g(r). In other words, higher-
quality managers make better management decisions. In particular, the term g(r) gives a 
representation of the quality of the entrepreneur who is running the firm, so that there are 
multiplicative productivity interactions.14 It also captures the idea that the quality of 
managers is embodied. This formulation implies scale economies since the marginal 
product of the additional quality of workers is increasing in g(r). However, the 
diminishing returns to Q imply that this scale economy is congested so that the best 
manager does not take all the workers. 
 
We assume that rY  exhibits constant returns to scale and that f and g(⋅) are a Cobb-
Douglas function; therefore we can rewrite (2) as 
                                                 
13 We therefore add technology to the original specification in Rosen (1982). 
14 This is related to the production function used in Kremer (1993), where the author considers multiple tasks, 
and explains how failure of one task can have a knock-on effect on other tasks. 
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1
rY sr Q
α α−= ,        (3) 
 
with 0<α<1. 
 
Next we study the occupational decision of individuals. An individual can decide 
between a managerial position, a working position, and production at home. We assume 
that an individual who engages in home production does not get any salary—therefore, 
whatever their level of underlying managerial talent, individuals will prefer being 
managers or workers in the labor market rather than engaging in the home production 
sector.15 
 
The decision between becoming a manager or a worker does depend on the endowment 
of managerial talent and is analyzed next. 
 
The managers’ problem 
A manager with r skills faces a two-stage decision. First, how much education (primary 
and higher) does she want to acquire as a manager? Second, how many workers is she 
going to hire? She takes wages (w) as given. We solve the problem by working 
backward. 
Stage 2: Given skills r, the manager’s problem is to choose the size of her company (or 
the size of her labor force, Qr) that maximizes gross income:16 
                                                 
15 This assumption is not necessary—it is only necessary that the wage received for home production is lower 
than the wage from market production (which is true in this model, as market workers invest in human capital 
and hence they are rewarded by their higher productivity), but it simplifies the analysis. 
16 The manager’s gross income is profits, while net income corresponds to profits minus total cost of education; 
net income is ignored here because it plays a role only in stage 1. 
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1max ,
r
r r rQ
sr Q wQααπ −= −
 
where the price of output is normalized to one and w is the market efficiency price for Qr 
(which we call the wage), so that the amount Qr of worker skills that maximizes profits 
is given by the first-order condition  
 
1
(1 )
r
s rQ
w
α αα −=    .        (4) 
 
Equation (4) is the demand function for worker skills for the firm, which determines the 
size of the firm. The greater the manager’s skills (r), the larger is her firm; the higher the 
wage, the lower the hiring; and the better the technology (s), the more workers are hired 
by r.  We can rewrite managers’ gross income as 
 
1 (1 ) 1
(1 )r s w r
α α
α α απ α α
− − − ≡ −  
.       (5) 
 
That is, the profit is a linear function of skills, where the factor of proportionality is a 
combination of wages and technology. 
Stage 1: Given that she knows that she will be rewarded according to (5), the manager 
chooses a level of human capital that maximizes her net income. We distinguish between 
primary and higher education, and the manager can only choose her investment in higher 
education because she needs to acquire pH units of primary education in order to get to 
higher schooling. Therefore, we can write the manager’s problem as 
 
,
,max
h r
net
r r p p h h rH
a H a Hπ π≡ − − ,      (6) 
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where aj, j = {p,h} denotes the cost of each unit of education of primary and higher 
schooling, respectively. 
 
It makes sense to think that the opportunity cost of education is given by human time and 
also other inputs, which are combined in the same proportions as in the production of 
GDP. In particular, it makes sense that aj and s grow at the same rate. For this reason, we 
assume that the cost of education evolves according to changes in GDP. That is, j ja sλ=  
for positive constants λj.  The first-order condition for problem (6) implies 
 
1 1 (1 ) 1
(1 )h hH c s w a T
α
β αβ αβ βα
− − − = −   
) ,     (7) 
 
where 
1 1 1
(1 ) (1 )
α
β αβ βα α α β
−
≡ − −) . 
 
That is, since p pa H  is a fixed cost to entrepreneurs, it enters their net income function (6) 
but does not affect their marginal decisions. 
Using (1) and (7), we see that a manager’s skill is optimally determined as a function 
of entrepreneurial talent at birth: 
 
1 1 (1 )(1 ) 1
ˆ(1 )p hr cH c s w a T
β α β β
β αβ αβ β α
− − − −− − = + −   
,      (8) 
 
where 1ˆ βα α −≡ ) . 
 
Notice that there is a linear relationship between the person's underlying entrepreneurial 
talent, T, and her managerial skills, r. Substituting (7) and (8) into (6) and (5) allows us 
to write managers’ net income as a linear function of talent at birth: 
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1 1 1 1 11 1
(1 ) (1 )netT p h p pc H s w c s w a T a H
α β βα
β αβ αβ β βα απ α αβ β
− − −− − −− = + − − −   
,     (9) 
 
where 
1
(1 )
α
αα α α
−
≡ − . That is, 
 
        
( ) ( ) ( )
( , , )netT h p pw s a T a Hπ ψ − + −= ⋅ − . 
 
Managers’ net income is depicted as in the profit line in Figure 1. 
 
Since s and ah are proportional, then ψ is homogeneous of degree one in s (because the 
wage rate will also grow at the same rate as s). That is, since s and aj grow at the same 
rate, in the steady state profits, wages and, therefore, GDP all grow at the same rate. 
However, Hh will remain constant over time. 
 
The workers’ problem 
(Market) workers earn qw as gross income. They can increase their productivity (q) by 
studying. Education for workers is primary education, with unit cost equal to ap. Since 
the maximum amount of primary schooling is pH , more schooling does not benefit 
workers.  Using (1), we can write the problem of workers as 
 
max
. .
1 .
p
net
w p pH
p p
p
I wq a H
s t H H
q H σ
= −
≤
= +
 
 
The optimal investment in primary education by workers is given by the first-order 
condition 
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1
1
,p w
p
wH
a
σσ − =    
.                   (10) 
 
The optimal decision in (10) is smaller than pH as long as the wage rate is relatively low, 
in particular, as long as 
 
1
p pa Hw
σ
σ
−
≤ .                  (11) 
 
Also, according to (10), the human capital investment for all workers is the same, 
regardless of underlying entrepreneurial talent. As long as the cost of schooling is the 
same, we can write 
 
1
1 1 ˆnetw pI w w a
σ
σ σσ−− −= + , 
 
where 1ˆ (1 )
σ
σσ σ σ−≡ − . That is, the workers’ net income is increasing in the wage rate and 
decreasing in the cost of schooling. The net income schedule for workers as a function of 
T is drawn in Figure 1. It is a horizontal line in T because the underlying managerial 
talent is only useful for managers. 
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Figure 1. Net Income Schedules for Workers and Managers 
 
The determination of workers and managers 
In Figure 1, we see that individuals with underlying entrepreneurial talent less than T’ 
optimally decide to be workers, while those with more underlying entrepreneurial talent 
than T’ optimally decide to be managers. We call T’ the cutoff level of talent since this is 
the level of underlying talent of the least-talented manager in the economy.17 
 
Proposition 1  A decrease in wages decreases the cutoff level of talent in the economy. 
 
Proof: see appendix. 
                                                 
17 The single-crossing property in the model, which determines who will be a manager and who will be a 
worker according to latent talent, is a simple feature in Rosen (1982) that we get with only assuming that net 
income schedules have different slopes (see footnote 12). Here we endogenize income schedules for two 
reasons: first, in order to see how a change in the labor market equilibrium affects occupational decisions of 
individuals and hence potential distortions, and second, to study the role of human capital. 
Profit
Iw
T 
T' 
Net 
income 
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Figure 2. Effects of a Decrease in Wage Rates 
 
The intuition of Proposition 1 is that, when wages fall, the incentive to be a manager 
increases. Since talent is uniformly distributed, some of those who were previously 
workers now decide to be managers, so that the least-talented manager is less talented 
than was the case at the higher level of wages. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, a decline in wages, which entails a decline in workers’ net income 
from wI  to 'wI  and hence an increase in profits, from Profit to Profit’, unambiguously 
results in a decline in T’, the cutoff level of talent of managers, to T’’. 
 
IV.B.  Labor Market Equilibrium Without Gender Discrimination 
In order to solve for the equilibrium wage rate w, we need to compute the aggregate 
supply and demand for worker skills. Notice that in this scenario, no individual engages 
in home production, because they get higher income from working as either workers or 
managers. 
 
Aggregate supply of workers’ skills without gender discrimination 
We assume that the distribution of initial talent is uniform between 0 and 1 (Figure 3). 
Profit' Profit
Iw
Iw'
T'T''
T
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Figure 3. Distribution of Underlying Managerial Talent in Population 
 
The fraction of the entire population that becomes workers is the integral between 0 and 
T’. From (9) we know that each of them will acquire the same amount of education, so 
that the skill of each worker is 
1
1
p
wq
a
σ
σσ − = +    
. 
 
The aggregate supply of worker skills (Q) is, hence, given by 
 
'( ) 1 1
0
1 '( ) 1
NDT w ND ND
ND ND
s
p p
w wQ P dT P T w
a a
σ σ
σ σσ σ− −         = + = ⋅ ⋅ +                  
∫ ,           (12) 
 
where ND stands for nondiscrimination. As we showed in Proposition 1, the cutoff level 
of talent is an increasing function of the wage rate. Hence, the supply of workers is an 
increasing function of the wage rate for two reasons. First, higher wages lead to more 
workers and fewer managers (this is represented by the T’(w) term). Second, higher 
wages increase the incentive to acquire worker skills. Note than even if we do not allow 
workers to acquire skills, the labor supply is still upward sloping. 
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Aggregate demand for worker skills without gender discrimination 
Each firm’s demand for worker skills is given by (4). There is a one-to-one relationship 
between managerial skills (r) and underlying entrepreneurial talent (T), given by (8), so 
that we can write the demand for labor of one firm in terms of T: 
 
TaswTawscHcwsQ h
ND
h
ND
p
ND
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1)1)(1(11111
−+−
−−−−−− ≡



−+−= µαα β
β
αβ
βα
αβ
β
βααα . 
 
The aggregate demand for worker skills is the sum of individual demands across all 
entrepreneurs; this demand can be represented as the individuals from the cutoff level of 
talent (T’) to talent equal to 1 (Figure 3), multiplied by P, the total population: 
 
( ) .
2
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21
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
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D
wTaswPdTPTaswQ
ND
µµ  (13) 
 
Holding constant T’, the aggregate demand for worker skills is decreasing in wages, 
increasing in technology, and decreasing in the unit cost of higher education. Holding 
these three constant, aggregate demand for worker skills is decreasing in T’. Since we 
showed that T’ is increasing in wages, it follows that the aggregate demand function 
depends negatively on wages for two reasons. First, as wages increase, each firm will 
demand fewer workers. Second, when wages rise, the cutoff level of talent increases, that 
is, fewer people want to be managers and the number of firms demanding workers 
declines. Hence, the overall effect of wages on labor demand is negative. 
 
The equilibrium wage rate is given by the equalization of (12) and (13), as seen in Figure 
4. 
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Figure 4. Labor Market Equilibrium Without Discrimination 
 
The number of entrepreneurs 
Let the total number of managers be M, which is the sum of male and female 
entrepreneurs, M=Mf+Mm. Since males and females are each one-half of the total 
population, and both genders are assumed to have the same underlying entrepreneurial 
talent, the total number of entrepreneurs without discrimination is 
 
1 1
, ,
'( ) '( )
1 1 1 '( )
2 2ND ND
ND m ND f ND ND
T w T w
P PM M M dT dT T w P = + = + = − ∫ ∫ .           (14) 
 
Economic growth 
How does the allocation of talent determine the growth rate of the economy? We assume 
that the increase in technology is determined by three factors. 
 
First, we consider that one determinant of growth is the average quality of ideas in the 
economy, where the quality of ideas can be represented by the underlying 
entrepreneurial talent of managers (this is the innovation aspect of growth).18 The reason 
                                                 
18 This is related to Murphy et al. (1991), where it is assumed that technology is determined by the underlying 
entrepreneurial talent of the most talented of the entrepreneurs. 
SND
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is that managers are heterogeneous, implying that the average quality of ideas will be a 
combination of good and bad ideas. Whether an idea is good or bad is apparent only 
after it has been tried out. If the idea turns out to be good, then it is adopted and the level 
of technology increases.  If it is bad, time and effort are wasted without any benefit. If 
more talented people tend to have good ideas and less talented people tend to have bad 
ideas, then people with smaller-than-average talent will tend to hurt the economy. Hence, 
one important factor is the average talent of managers. 
 
Second, we assume that economic growth also depends positively on the average 
workers’ productivity (adoption aspect of growth). The intuition is that more productive 
workers will be more able to follow the manager’s instructions and hence will adopt 
innovation better.19 
 
Finally, we assume that there is a residual dimension to growth that is related to health 
issues and is basically determined by the education of individuals who engage in home 
production. The intuition is that, even if some people in the economy may not work in 
the labor market, increasing their education increases growth because they become more 
aware of e.g. health issues (this is empirically plausible especially in developing 
countries).20 
 
                                                 
19 These two factors are related to Acemoglu et al. (2002), who assume that there is an innovation and adoption 
or investment dimensions to growth; however in their setting there is a trade-off between the two dimensions.  
20 Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Martin et al. (1983) provide empirical evidence for less developed countries 
that higher levels of education (controlling for income) are associated with lower levels of infant and child 
mortality.  Rajna et al. (1998) estimate that, even controlling for socioeconomic factors, illiterate women in Uttar 
Pradesh (India) face a 1.6 times higher risk of later childhood deaths of their children compared with women 
educated to at least the middle school level.  More generally, recent evidence (Topel (1999), Krueger and 
Lindahl (2001)) suggests there is a positive correlation between education and economic growth (using both the 
change and initial level of education, even though the latter is appropiate for countries with very low levels of 
education only). 
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In particular, 
 ( ){ }NEwHAPwTATftsts p )),(()),('(1)1()( +⋅−= , 
 
where f’ is positive in all of its arguments and AT denotes average talent of managers, AP 
denotes average workers’ productivity, and NE denotes average education of individuals 
who engage in home production.   
 
Then it follows that the rate at which technology, costs of education, wages, and profits 
grow in this economy is some combination of AT, AP, and NE (in case there are home 
workers). Therefore, the growth rate of the economy is given by some combination of 
 
( )1 1 '( )
2
AT T w= +                  (15) 
)(1 wHAP p+=  
)0(pHNE = . 
 
IV.C. Labor Market Equilibrium with Gender Discrimination in Managerial  
             Positions 
We now consider the implications of gender discrimination. We analyze two cases. First, 
gender discrimination can occur in managerial positions (that is, the case in which 
women are not allowed to be entrepreneurs).  In the next section, we look at the stronger 
case of discrimination in which women cannot take part in the labor force either as 
managers or as workers. We refer to the former as partial discrimination (PD), and the 
latter, as total discrimination (TD). Instead, we could model partial discrimination 
assuming that setting a firm requires a fixed investment, such that the entrepreneur has to 
borrow some amount of money. Then partial discrimination would for instance consist 
of women facing higher interest rates in the credit market. For interest rates high enough, 
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no female would decide to be an entrepreneur. That is, this type of discrimination in the 
labor market could be the result of discrimination in the credit market.21 A more subtle 
way to think about this is in the context of a low self-esteem hypothesis: suppose that 
individuals cannot observe their endowment of T, the underlying managerial talent, and 
that women are told (e.g. by society in general) that they are not talented enough to be 
managers—this would become self-fulfilling in the sense that women will not invest into 
higher education and disproportionately fill working positions. 
 
Aggregate supply of worker skills with partial gender discrimination 
Suppose gender discrimination consists of not allowing women to have access to 
managerial positions. Women, however, may still have access to schooling and worker 
positions. Notice that since earnings as home worker are zero, women who would be 
managers without discrimination will still prefer to work in the labor market (even as 
workers) and earn wages than to engage in home production. Therefore, in this scenario 
no individuals become home workers. For every wage, partial discrimination affects the 
demand and supply of worker skills. The supply of workers will tend to increase because 
all women are now workers: 
 
1 1 '( ) 1'( ) 1 ( ) 1
2 2 2
PD PD PD
PD PD PD
s
p p
P w P w T wQ T w q w P
a a
σ σ
σ σσ σ− −        +   = ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ = +                      
.       (16) 
 
Since T'(w)<1, the rightmost term is larger than T'(w). Hence, for every wage, the supply 
curve with partial discrimination is to the right of the curve without discrimination.  
                                                 
21 In what would be the opposite case, Coate and Tennyson (1992) show that, under some condition, individuals 
who are discriminated against in the labor market will face higher interest rates and will hence have less 
incentive to enter self-employment than those who are not discriminated against, even after allowing for 
investments in human capital.  In both cases though, discrimination in one market spills over to another market. 
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Aggregate demand for worker skills with partial gender discrimination 
Demand for worker skills will tend to fall because there are no female managers: 
 
 ( ) 21
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For every wage, demand for worker skills is one-half of what it was without 
discrimination. In other words, the demand curve with partial discrimination is to the left 
of the curve without discrimination. Hence, the equilibrium wage unambiguously 
declines (see Figure 5). The change in the total quantity of worker skills that is hired in 
equilibrium is ambiguous because, with discrimination, we have higher supply and lower 
demand. 
 
The intuition is that, for a given wage rate, the human capital investment decisions of 
men and the cutoff level of talent for men remain unchanged. Hence, discrimination 
against women in managerial positions has two consequences. First, it increases the 
supply of workers, as all women become workers. Second, it decreases the demand for 
workers, as all firms that would have been headed by women no longer exist.  Both 
factors work to lower the wages of workers. 
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Figure 5.  Labor Market Equilibrium with Partial Gender Discrimination 
 
The number of managers with partial gender discrimination 
In this case, the total number of female managers is zero (by definition); at a given wage, 
therefore, the total number of entrepreneurs will decline. Since the equilibrium wage is 
lower, the cutoff level of talent for the remaining male managers is lower, so more males 
are going to become entrepreneurs. Hence, the total number of managers is 
 
1
, ,
'( )
1 0 1 '( )
2 2PD
PD m PD f PD PD
T w
P PM M M dT T w = + = + = − ∫ . 
Since T’(wPD)<T’(wND) while 2P P<  (that is, the number of male managers is larger 
because of lower wages while the number of female managers drops to zero), the overall 
effect of this type of discrimination on the number of entrepreneurs is ambiguous. Since 
the fraction of the population who are managers (1-T’) is very small, it is possible that 
we end up with more managers when there is partial gender discrimination, because a 
higher proportion of men will decide to become managers; it depends on the sensitivity 
to wages of the cutoff level of talent for males and the sensitivity of the wage rate to the 
requirement that all women work as workers. In sum, the change in the number of 
entrepreneurs is ambiguous, but it is likely that the decrease in the number of managers 
due to the prohibition of female managers is larger than the increase of male managers 
due to the lower equilibrium wage. 
 
Proposition 2  For wages high enough, workers complete primary school even in the 
case of partial discrimination (which implies a wage cut).  In that case, the ratio of 
female-to-male primary education is the same as without discrimination, that is, equal to 
one.  However, for wages low enough, the ratio of female-to-male primary education is 
lower in the case of partial discrimination than in the absence of discrimination. 
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Proof: see appendix. 
 
Corollary  For developed countries, where wages tend to be high, there is no gender 
inequality in primary education even in the case of partial discrimination.  In contrast, 
for developing countries, where wage rates tend to be low, partial discrimination implies 
gender inequality in primary education. 
 
Propositions 3 and 4 establish the implications of the effects of partial discrimination 
from the first case (developing countries), which is empirically the most plausible: 
 
Proposition 3  Discrimination against females in managerial positions implies (i) lower 
female education than without discrimination, (ii) more education for male managers 
and less education for male workers, and (iii) lower average education for females than 
for males in both primary and higher education. 
 
Proof: On the one hand, by (10) lower equilibrium wages imply that workers will 
optimally invest less in education. Therefore it follows that females (who cannot become 
managers by definition) will all invest less in education. The same applies for male 
workers. By (7), lower wages on the other hand imply that male managers will increase 
their investment in higher education (primary education for managers is fixed). Finally, 
females have lower average education than males in both primary and higher education, 
since 1) females who were managers without discrimination will, with partial 
discrimination, reduce their investment in primary education as workers because the 
returns are lower, and 2) women who were workers without discrimination reduce their 
acquirement of primary studies. QED 
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The change in average male education is however ambiguous because the change in the 
number of managers is ambiguous.  
 
Proposition 4  Discrimination against females in managerial positions implies lower 
economic growth. 
 
Proof: Lower equilibrium wages in the case of partial discrimination implies, according 
to Proposition 1, a lower cutoff level of talent. On the one hand, according to (15), the 
latter in turn implies that the average talent of entrepreneurs is smaller (which leads to 
less innovation). On the other hand, workers’ productivity depends on their primary 
education, which in turn depends on wages. By Proposition 3 we know that male 
workers optimally decide to study less than without discrimination, so average workers’ 
productivity is lower (leading to less adoption). Both factors imply a lower rate of 
economic growth.  QED 
 
Therefore discrimination in the form of a social norm that does not allow women to be 
managers has negative implications for growth.22 
 
IV.D. Labor Market Equilibrium with Total Gender Discrimination in the  
            Labor Market 
                                                 
22 A similar conclusion might be reached through an alternative type of discrimination.  Suppose that girls face a 
larger cost of higher schooling than boys, that is, mhfh aa ,, > , where f denotes female and m denotes male. This 
could be the result of a social norm where paternalistic parents are willing to pay for their daughter’s primary 
education if they have the means but not the extra amount needed for higher education, because women are not 
expected to enter the labor force in the future, therefore there are no private gains from girls’ higher education. 
Then it can be shown that since women face lower incentives to be managers, in equilibrium wages are lower 
than without discrimination, and a larger proportion of men than of women become managers—nevertheless 
those women who become managers are in average more talented than male managers, even though their average 
education will be lower than their male counterpart.  Furthermore, under a certain condition it can be shown that 
this situation lowers the average cutoff level of talent and hence economic growth. 
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Aggregate supply of worker skills with total gender discrimination 
Suppose gender discrimination consists of not allowing women to have access to 
managerial positions or to become workers. We interpret this as a social norm that is 
enforced by the existence of social stigma, in the same spirit as Goldin (1994) describes 
social stigma as a deterrent to women’s participation in the labor market.23 In particular, 
she models this social stigma as a cost to the household: each family has a value S giving 
the utility that would be lost from the social stigma of having a wife work for wages 
(“only a husband who is lazy, indolent, and entirely negligent of his family would allow 
his wife to do such labor”). This cost is not a function of the number of hours at work 
but is “all or none”. In this paper, in order to see the aggregate costs of such social 
stigma, we assume that the cost that this social norm or stigma represents is large enough 
for women to turn to the home production sector. This could be modeled in an 
intrahousehold context, as in Goldin (1994), and the result would be the same. 
In this case, females’ human capital is zero because, in this model, education is only 
useful to individuals who take part in the labor market.  For every wage, this affects the 
demand and supply of worker skills. Supply in this case is 
 
  
1
'( ) 1
2
TD
TD TD
s
p
P wQ T w
a
σ
σσ −   = ⋅ ⋅ +       
.            (13’) 
 
Hence, for a given wage, the supply of worker skills is one-half of the supply without 
gender discrimination. 
 
                                                 
23 More precisely she associates social stigma to having a wife work as a manufacturing operative or manual 
labourer.  
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Aggregate demand for worker skills with total gender discrimination 
As in the case of gender discrimination in managerial positions, demand for worker 
skills is simply one-half of what it was without discrimination. 
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Hence, relative to the situation of discrimination in managerial positions, the equilibrium 
wage unambiguously increases, while the amount of worker skills hired in equilibrium 
decreases (see Figure 6). Unlike in the nondiscrimination case, since both aggregate 
supply of, and demand for, worker skills change in the same proportion, the wage rate is 
the same, although in the total discrimination equilibrium less worker skills are hired. 
Figure 6.  Labor Market Equilibrium with Total Gender Discrimination 
 
The number of managers with total gender discrimination 
The total number of managers is 
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Since the equilibrium wage rate increases, the number of managers is unambiguously 
smaller than in the case of discrimination in managerial positions. By (14) and (14’), and 
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given that the cutoff level of talent with total discrimination is the same as without 
discrimination, the number of managers with total discrimination is one-half of the 
number without discrimination. Propositions 5 and 6 summarize the effects of total 
gender discrimination. 
 
Proposition 5  Gender discrimination in the overall labor market implies that (i) 
average female education is lower, for both primary and higher education, (ii) male 
education is the same as without discrimination, and (iii) average female education is 
lower than male education. 
 
Proof: (i) follows from the fact that in the model, education is only useful if in the labor 
market, while (ii) follows from (7) and (10). Finally, (iii) follows from (i) and (ii). QED 
 
Proposition 6  Gender discrimination in the overall labor market implies (i) lower 
economic growth, and (ii) lower per capita GDP.24, 25 
 
Proof: (i) follows from the residual determinant of economic growth, as some 
individuals (half the population—all females in the economy) who were previously 
working outside the home and hence investing in some positive level of education in the 
existence of discrimination optimally decide not to get any education. Part (ii) follows 
from the fact that population is the same as without discrimination while women who 
were managers or workers without discrimination have to engage in home production 
                                                 
24 Hence this prediction of total gender discrimination is similar to the one from the model in Galor and Weil 
(1996) where, taking into account fertility and assuming two different types of skills among individuals, as long 
as women do not participate in the labor force the rate of economic growth declines over time. 
25 This is consistent with no scale effects in the sense that the average talent of managers and the average 
productivity of (market) workers are the same as without discrimination. 
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with discrimination, which is less productive than production outside the home; hence 
per capita GDP decreases. QED 
 
IV.E. Discussion: Sustainability of Gender Discrimination 
 
After analyzing the negative consequences of discrimination we must explore the 
reasons why discrimination can persist. This may be particularly unclear in the case that 
the total household income, i.e. of husband and wife, is less as a consequence of 
discrimination. In the context of a unitary model of the household, discrimination could 
not persist. A bargaining approach is needed to understand the sustainability.26 
 
For instance, a man who is married to a woman who is a manager in a situation of no 
discrimination may be worse off by the introduction of partial discrimination (where she 
can only be a worker) or total discrimination (where she cannot participate in the labor 
market), due to the fact that her income decreases. However, in the case of partial 
discrimination, this also depends on whether the husband’s own working status (and 
hence his income) change due to discrimination. 
 
Since our aim is to address the sustainability of discrimination, we use nondiscrimination 
as a benchmark and compare it to either partial discrimination or total discrimination. 
We assume that every household consists of a husband and a wife. 
 
How is this relevant for the cases of discrimination explored in this paper? From the 
point of view of a cooperative bargaining framework, where the threat point is divorce, 
the individuals’ bargaining strength depends positively in their own outside option, 
                                                 
26 Additionally, empirical evidence seems to reject the unitary model, in particular, income pooling is rejected 
(Mansen (1993), Thomas (1993)). 
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while depends negatively on their partners’ outside option. That is, in general, if the 
woman’s earnings increase with the suppression of discrimination, her outside option is 
stronger (as she would still be able to earn a wage in the case of divorce), which would 
decrease the husband’s utility.27 Generally, however, to the extent that the woman’s 
participation in the labor market increases the size of the cake, this would increase the 
husband’s utility (note that this is not always true, as in the case of males that are 
workers with the suppression of partial discrimination but are managers under partial 
discrimination).28 
 
Nevertheless, the type of discrimination in this paper is more consistent with the 
predictions of a model of (noncooperative) separate spheres bargaining, as introduced by 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993). This is preferred to a cooperative framework for several 
reasons. A perhaps subtle reason is that the latter requires the threat point to depend on 
divorce, while in developing countries with very unequal gender relations, such as India 
and other countries relevant for this analysis, divorce either involves substantial 
transaction costs or can be dominated by sharing public goods within an intact but 
noncooperative marriage, where a division of labor based on socially recognized and 
sanctioned gender roles emerges without explicit bargaining. In this case, the relevant 
threat point is not divorce but the noncooperative, voluntary equilibrium within 
marriage. Cooperative bargaining is distinguished by the ability of players to make 
binding agreements within marriage.  Then, as shown by Lundberg and Pollak (1993), it 
                                                 
27 In the cooperative bargaining model the increase in the wife’s earnings can be either represented by an 
increase in her outside option or an increase in her weight in the maximization problem. 
28 In the case of men who are workers even without discrimination, if their wife’s outside option increases in the 
same proportion as the total cake, then they are not better off by the removal of discrimination.  Notice that this 
is the relevant comparison if there is assortative matching.  The analysis is the same in the case of the 
suppression of total discrimination. 
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will be optimal for couples with high transaction costs (which arise because of the 
negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of such agreements) or low expected gains 
from cooperation to remain at the stereotypical non-cooperative solution, where the 
division of labor is based on socially recognized gender roles. More importantly, the 
argument that cooperation does break down seems especially appropriate in the case of 
India, where borrowing constraints are severe and therefore agents have low discount 
rates. 
 
Let us use an example as illustration. Think of couple A, where Mr A is not very talented 
in terms of managerial ability (T) and therefore would naturally choose to be a worker, 
while Mrs A is relatively more endowed with managerial talent and therefore she 
optimally is a manager (under no discrimination). Would cooperation work? We can 
think of the surplus from cooperation as being positively given by total income and 
negatively given by the male disutility from her wife’s higher occupation (this could be 
some sort of stigma or simply the fact he is teased by colleagues) or the fact that she is 
working. We can think of some sort of distribution of this disutility among males—for 
some males it may be equal to zero, for others, infinite—so as long as the disutility is 
larger than income, cooperation can break down. 
 
Finally, there is an issue regarding the existence of assortative matching across 
households. In particular, if the most talented man marries the most talented woman, it is 
efficient for women to work at home (or hold unskilled—less demanding— positions) as 
long as there is some comparative advantage of men over women in working outside 
home, and the cost of providing household goods and services is lower than the external 
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market rate. 29 This would undermine the misallocation of talent explored in this paper—
unless, as argued before, there are transaction costs that lead to the dominated 
equilibrium. We will come back to this issue after the empirical analysis. 
 
 
 
V. Empirical Evidence 
The theoretical section provides motivation for the hypothesis that a lower number of 
females relative to males in 1) managerial positions and 2) worker positions as a whole 
has negative implications for development.  In particular, the model in section four 
argues that gender discrimination in managerial positions implies a misallocation of 
talent that leads to lower economic growth through the innovation and adoption 
dimensions of economic growth, while gender discrimination in the overall labor market 
has negative economic consequences through the education dimension of growth. We 
test the implications of the theoretical section using data from sixteen Indian states over 
1961-91.  The output measure we use is per capita net domestic product. 
 
The gender discrimination variables we use are based on the number of female and male 
managers and total workers:30 in the model, and by the definition of discrimination that 
is used in it, these variables would perfectly measure discrimination. We expect the ratio 
of female-to-male managers or workers to partly reflect gender inequality that is driven 
by gender discrimination, as of the types described in the theoretical section. 
                                                 
29 The model is in this feature similar to the one in Francois (1998), where gender discrimination is inefficient (in 
particular, there are gains from trading occupations within the household) only when members in the household 
differ. 
30 The variable we call managers corresponds to the variable that is called employers in the Census of India and 
is described as “a person who had necessarily to employ other persons in order to carry on the business from 
which he served his likelihood.” See the data appendix for definitions and sources of the data. 
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In Table 1 we present means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis, by state, averaged for the period 1961-91. Typically, states with the 
highest ratios of female-to-male managers and total workers are southern states 
(Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh) while states with the lowest ratios are usually in 
North India (Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab). Interestingly, there is no strong 
direct relationship between these variables and income. For instance, Haryana and 
Punjab are relatively rich, while Jammu and Kashmir is at about the all-India average 
income, while there is also diversity among states with higher female-to-male 
employment ratios: Kerala and Orissa have lower-than-average income, while Andhra 
Pradesh and Karnataka have approximately average income. In fact, it seems that as 
explained in Section II, these statistics would in fact tend to suggest that female labor 
participation relative to male is higher in poorer states. 
 
We take advantage of the panel nature of the data and run regressions of the type: 
 
ittsststst xry εγαξδ ++++=        (17) 
 
where y is the log of per capita net state domestic product, r denotes the ratio of the 
number of females to males in a certain class of the labor force (namely managers and 
total workers), x denotes controls (human capital, and other socioeconomic controls such 
as population growth, the ratio of urban to total population, and the ratio of capital to 
labor), α is a state effect, and γ is a year fixed-effect. State effects pick up effects that 
vary among states but are constant over time, as well as heterogeneous initial conditions; 
year effects pick up shocks that are common to all states but differ over time. 
 
An important issue with output level estimation is potential serial correlation. In fact, a 
Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally invariant test, which tests for the presence of serial correlation 
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in the context of unequally spaced panel data, rejects the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation of the disturbances at the 5 percent level. Hence, and in light of recent 
research about fixed-effects panel models estimation (Bertrand et al. (2003), Kézdi 
(2002)) showing that the cluster estimator behaves well with finite samples, we cluster 
our standard errors by state to deal with concerns with serial correlation. 
 
In Table 2 we present the results of estimating (17). Columns (1) and (3) represent the 
key basic results in the paper: in line with the theory, the estimates show that gender 
discrimination acts as a brake on economic development. In column (1), the ratio of 
female-to-male managers is positively related to total output growth, and this 
relationship is significant at the 1 percent level, controlling for female and male literacy 
rates, population growth, the ratio of urban to total population, and the ratio of capital to 
labor (the latter is introduced as a proxy for technology). We run the respective 
regression for the ratio of female-to-male total workers, and find a lower coefficient. The 
relationship, however, is also significant at the 1 percent level. In columns (2) and (4) we 
additionally control for caste (introducing the percentage of the population that belongs 
to scheduled castes or scheduled tribes) and the total size of the labor force. The 
estimated coefficients for our variables of interest are of the same size and still 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
We can think of the quality of institutions as a possible covariate of gender composition 
of the labor force. However, to the extent that institutions have not changed much over 
the period of study, or that they may not differ by state, this effect is captured by the 
fixed effects. We also control for time-varying institutional quality using political 
controls as described below. 
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There is an issue regarding home production.  In particular, if women’s participation in 
the labor force relative to men’s has been increasing (which may have therefore 
decreased their—officially not accounted for—home production) along with per capita 
GDP, as predicted by the model, the positive effect that we find might appear because of 
this accounting fact rather than because of discrimination itself.  However, a quick look 
at Figures A2 and A3 in the appendix suggests that this cannot be the case, as female-to-
male ratios of managers and workers have evolved over time differently by state. 
 
An issue could be raised regarding omitted policy bias: there exists the possibility that 
our variables of interest might be capturing some other sort of policy that is undertaken 
at the state level.  Even though gender sensitive legislation and policy-making exist only 
at the national level, some other type of policy at the state level might happen to be 
related to gender-wise work participation. We cannot possibly control for any state-level 
policy but we can follow the strategy in Besley and Burgess (2002) and control for 
government responsiveness using the following political controls: electoral turnout 
lagged one period, a measure of political competition (the absolute difference in the 
share of seats occupied by the main political party and its main competitor), and a 
dummy for whether it is an election year. The results from adding these political controls 
are in columns (3) and (6) respectively; results are unchanged. Therefore, our results are 
robust to the inclusion of proxies for government and institutional quality. 
An obvious concern is causality.  In particular, we might worry that the statistical 
positive relationship we are estimating is arising due to the possibility that richer states 
have higher female-to-male employment ratios.  We try and control for potential 
endogeneity using the ratio of prosecutions launched to the number of complaints 
received under the Maternity Benefits Act (1961).  According to India’s First Report for 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),  
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the Government of India recognizes that provision of maternity benefit is the most 
crucial element which affects women workers, therefore it is doing its utmost to extend 
maternity benefits to all women. 31 
 
The administration of the Act in States is the responsibility of the Factory Inspectorates. 
Inspectors are appointed by the corresponding State Governments. This is a proper 
instrument as long as the determinants of the launch of a prosecution are not a direct 
determinant of per capita output. The state with larger values is the one furthest south—
Tamil Nadu—with approximately average per capita income relative to other states 
during the period. 
 
In order to further study the exogeneity of the instrument, we take a look at the 
correlation between this variable and some variables—first, log of per capita net 
domestic income, but also other variables that could proxy for the level of development. 
In Table 3 we provide the estimates of regressing the ratio of prosecutions launched 
under the Maternity Benefit Act to the number of complaints received, controlling for 
state and year fixed effects. The number of prosecutions to complaints received is not 
significantly correlated with income (column (1)), the quality of the judiciary ((2)), and 
two proxies for the size of the state level budget (expenditure on the organs of the state 
and on administration services, in columns (3) and (4) respectively).32 Given these 
results we expect differences in number of prosecutions to proxy for variation in cultural 
values that promote female labor force participation, hence being fairly exogenous. 
                                                 
31 For more details regarding the Maternity Benefits Act (1961) see the data appendix. 
32 The quality of the judiciary is measured by annual pendency rates, where the pendency rate is constructed by 
Besley and Burgess (2003) by adding the number of cases pending at the beginning of the year to cases filed in 
the year and dividing this by cases resolved during the year. 
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Therefore our prior that this variable is capturing cultural values seems validated. Apart 
from validating the instrumental variable procedure, these results are interesting in that 
they suggest that cultural attitudes are not closely linked to economic development. This 
would suggest that development will not be enough to erode gender discrimination. This 
is a theme to which we will return in the conclusions. 
 
We present the instrumented results in Table 4. The estimated coefficients for the 
female-to-male ratios of managers and workers (columns (1) and (2)) are positively 
significant at the 5 percent level (p-values equal 2 percent).33 Interestingly, estimated 
coefficients for these two variables are higher than without being instrumented, 
suggesting that the relationship from income to female labor participation is actually 
negative. This is consistent with the hypothesis that it is poorer women who engage in 
working activity, and that the social norm is binding. That is, if anything, endogeneity 
was biasing our coefficients downwards. The bottom line is that our main result, that 
gender discrimination hinders development, goes through in the instrumented 
regressions. Taking the results from these instrumented regressions, we find that an 
increase of 10 percent in the female-to-male ratio of managers would increase per capita 
net domestic product by 2 percent, while an increase of 10 percent in the female-to-male 
ratio of total workers would increase per capita net domestic product by 8 percent. These 
results suggest that gender inequality in the access to working positions is a bigger brake 
on growth than gender inequality in the access to managerial positions. In particular, an 
increase in one standard deviation in the number of female-to-male managers would 
increase output per capita by approximately 12%, while the increase would be equal to 
                                                 
33 Other potential instrumental variables have been tried (e.g. the percentage of women elected for seats at state-
level legislative assemblies, gender-wise turnout) and discarded because they have turned out being bad 
instruments at standard significance levels, in the sense that they are not correlated to female-to-male ratios of 
managers or workers. 
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37% if the number of female-to-male total workers increases in one standard deviation. 
In terms of India’s states, we can calculate the increase in total output per capita that 
would have occurred if all states would have had Karnataka’s female employment 
figures. Female-to-male managers and workers are of the highest in the state of 
Karnataka.  Had India’s states have had Karnataka’s figures, total output would have 
increased by over a third (35%) due to more female-to-male managers, and by almost 
10% due to more female-to-male total workers. That is, the efficiency costs from gender 
discrimination in the labor market are big. 
 
Results from the first-stage regressions are also presented in Table 4 (columns (3) and 
(4)). As suspected, the ratio of prosecutions launched to the number of complaints 
received under the Maternity Benefits Act is positively correlated with female-to-male 
managers and total workers, suggesting that states where more prosecutions are started 
have better conditions for female labor force participation (p-values for the instrument 
are 5 and 8 percent respectively).  
 
In Table 5 we take a closer look at the picture by using disaggregated output measures as 
dependent variables. The estimated coefficient for the female-to-male managers is in fact 
not significantly related to agricultural output (column (1)), while it is significant at the 5 
percent level in the case of female-to-male workers (column (2)). This suggests that the 
way in which agricultural output is hindered by gender discrimination is not through 
women not being able to be managers but from restricted access to work participation in 
general. This is in accord with the model as the inefficiency generated by discrimination 
in managerial positions works through the misallocation of managerial talent, which 
plays a minor role in the agricultural sector. This may be interpreted as consistent with 
distortions in the allocation of talent being more important where there are fewer e.g. 
physical comparative advantages—in the case of agriculture, comparative advantages by 
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gender in e.g. physical strength would presumably be more important, while in the case 
of non-agricultural sectors, where managerial skills play a greater role rather than 
physical skills, comparative advantages are less important.   
 
Regarding non-agricultural output (columns (3)-(4)), coefficients for both the female-to-
male managers and total workers are significant at the 1 and 5 percent level respectively. 
These results seem to suggest that the way in which gender inequality may hinder 
development is twofold. While social norms that restrict women’s access to the labor 
market in general lower output in general, distortions in the allocation of talent between 
managerial and unskilled positions also affect output negatively in sectors where 
managerial talent is relatively important (that is, sectors where physical skills are 
relatively less important). In sum, this empirical evidence suggests that states where the 
female-to-male ratios of managers and workers are lower do have lower output. This is 
consistent with the predictions from the model described in section four. 
 
In the theoretical section we have raised the issue of how the existence of assortative 
matching and comparative advantage might prove discrimination efficient. Although this 
is theoretically plausible, in light of the empirical evidence that we have just examined—
whereby ceteris paribus states that have larger numbers of women at work have 
experienced larger per capita GDP—we conclude that this theoretical possibility is not 
empirically relevant, but rather, that there exist substantial transaction costs in 
intrahousehold bargaining so that the suboptimal, nooncoperative equilibrium can be 
sustained. Moreover, the efficiency costs of gender discrimination are big. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
This paper provides theoretical and empirical support for the view that gender 
discrimination acts as a brake on economic development. We find that a 10 percent 
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increase in the female-to-male managers ratio in India would increase total output per 
capita by 2 percent, while a 10 percent increase in the female-to-male workers ratio 
would increase total output per capita by 8 percent. This is in accord with the theoretical 
predictions of our model, according to which gender discrimination in either managerial 
positions or the overall labor market has negative economic consequences. The intuition 
is as follows. If women cannot gain access to managerial positions, the equilibrium wage 
rate declines, and the cutoff level of talent of managers declines as well, so that the 
average talent of entrepreneurs and economic growth both decline. If females cannot 
participate in the labor market, but have to engage in home production, the wage rate is 
the same as without discrimination, so that the cutoff level of talent is the same and, 
therefore, there are no innovation or adoption implications. Nevertheless, growth 
decreases due to the fact that half the population acquires zero education. Moreover, the 
theory predicts that per capita output is lower than it is without discrimination. 
 
We find that the effects of gender discrimination are more serious in particular sectors of 
the economy. In particular, we find that lower ratios of female-to-male workers 
significantly reduce total output in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural sector, 
while lower numbers of female-to-male managers reduce output in the non-agricultural 
sector, but not in the agricultural sector  This is in line with the model in this paper in 
that distortions in the allocation of managerial talent play a larger role in sectors where 
higher skills are needed—as opposed to sectors that require more physical abilities, as 
agriculture. Therefore, these results can be matched to the model’s predictions in the 
sense that while gender discrimination in the form of restricting women’s access to work 
lowers output in all sectors, gender discrimination in managerial positions that distorts 
the allocation of talent between managerial and unskilled positions lowers output in 
sectors where managerial talent is relatively more important than physical comparative 
advantages.  
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The fact that we find a close matching of the empirical results to the theoretical 
predictions and that our results are robust to the inclusion of various controls for omitted 
variables and to potential endogeneity make us more confident that gender 
discrimination has a detrimental effect on economic development, and that this effect is 
large. 
 
Moreover, our results also suggest that female labor participation will not necessarily 
increase with economic growth. In fact, it seems that richer states tend to have lower 
ratios of female-to-male labor participation, suggesting indeed the existence of a 
discriminatory social norm that is binding. This is also related to the theoretical section, 
where we also discuss how it is possible that gender discrimination, despite its harmful 
economic consequences, is a sustainable social norm. Therefore for economic 
development it is crucial to try and erode this discriminatory social norm by encouraging 
policies and education that underline the value of women in society and in particular in 
the labor market. We need to think about targeted policies that change social norms and 
society’s perceptions of what women are capable of.  In that sense, our understanding of 
what policies are effective in shifting deeply embedded cultural norms like gender 
discrimination is extremely limited. Nevertheless, there is a role for the government in 
financing projects like Mahila Samakhya, a women's empowerment project launched in 
1986 by the Ministry of Human Resource Development which, through the building of 
village level collectives, seeks to bring about a change in women's perception about 
themselves and that of society regarding women's traditional roles.   
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Table 1.  Summary of main variables in the analysis, 1961-1991 
STATE Female- 
to-male 
managers 
Female- 
to-male 
total 
workers 
Share of 
female 
managers 
Share of 
male 
managers 
Share of 
female 
employees 
Share of  
male 
employees 
Share of 
female  
single 
workers 
Share of 
male 
single 
workers 
Share of 
female 
family 
workers 
Share of 
male 
family 
workers 
Female 
literacy 
rate 
Male  
literacy 
 rate 
Net per 
capita 
real 
income 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
0.082 
(0.020) 
0.211 
(0.043) 
3.832 
(2.358) 
8.586 
(2.827) 
36.27 
(6.570) 
49.86 
(3.687) 
34.84 
(3.870) 
31.32 
(3.801) 
25.05 
(5.641) 
10.24 
(3.239) 
0.185 
(0.043) 
0.426 
(0.044) 
1004 
(260) 
Assam 
 
0.037 
(0.018) 
0.275 
(0.028) 
0.671 
(0.097) 
4.778 
(1.365) 
90.93 
(6.238) 
71.54 
(3.934) 
4.636 
(2.678) 
17.48 
(3.192) 
3.764 
(3.526) 
6.208 
(2.170) 
0.203 
(0.058) 
0.599 
(0.084) 
903 
(196) 
Bihar 
 
0.030 
(0.011) 
0.086 
(0.025) 
2.273 
(1.195) 
6.331 
(2.244) 
57.03 
(12.65) 
60.95 
(4.550) 
33.15 
(15.26) 
27.21 
(4.557) 
7.548 
(2.549) 
5.505 
(1.947) 
0.116 
(0.037) 
0.419 
(0.050) 
633 
(110) 
Gujarat 
 
0.023 
(0.009) 
0.126 
(0.030) 
0.788 
(0.402) 
3.988 
(1.691) 
52.13 
(10.40) 
58.51 
(1.522) 
27.87 
(11.44) 
26.39 
(1.592) 
19.20 
(9.570) 
11.11 
(1.420) 
0.303 
(0.065) 
0.596 
(0.059) 
1176 
(272) 
Haryana 
 
0.014 
(0.004) 
0.071 
(0.009) 
2.224 
(1.099) 
9.321 
(3.011) 
77.57 
(2.412) 
59.17 
(2.424) 
17.28 
(2.785) 
27.71 
(4.176) 
2.924 
(0.955) 
3.799 
(1.304) 
0.223 
(0.052) 
0.541 
(0.066) 
1444 
(357) 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
0.016 
(0.010) 
0.061 
(0.006) 
1.699 
(1.935) 
4.800 
(3.593) 
56.25 
(13.15) 
59.96 
(0.383) 
14.67 
(29.56) 
29.56 
(2.782) 
27.38 
(10.82) 
5.681 
(0.996) 
0.096 
(0.037) 
0.313 
(0.068) 
1021 
(228) 
Karnataka 
 
0.053 
(0.010) 
0.219 
(0.029) 
2.038 
(0.631) 
7.882 
(1.874) 
62.20 
(8.787) 
61.11 
(1.950) 
27.46 
(9.208) 
25.47 
(3.509) 
8.298 
(0.504) 
5.542 
(0.227) 
0.251 
(0.071) 
0.535 
(0.062) 
1037 
(217) 
Kerala 
 
0.034 
(0.006) 
  0.239 
 (0.013) 
0.599 
(0.139) 
4.470 
(0.674) 
74.68 
(8.44) 
59.20 
(6.778) 
21.61 
(8.676) 
33.57 
(7.193) 
3.109 
(0.287) 
2.767 
(0.344) 
0.650 
(0.118) 
0.825 
(0.066) 
864 
(182) 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
0.044 
(0.006) 
0.122 
(0.071) 
2.054 
(0.850) 
4.373 
(1.658) 
49.76 
(11.52) 
67.73 
(15.64) 
36.61 
(9.893) 
22.32 
(11.14) 
11.57 
(2.329) 
5.579 
(2.934) 
0.140 
(0.049) 
0.444 
(0.069) 
843 
(190) 
Maharashtr
a 
 
0.046 
(0.016) 
0.143 
(0.018) 
2.423 
(1.371) 
6.602 
(2.017) 
68.13 
(7.552) 
69.93 
(2.080) 
21.44 
(5.695) 
18.91 
(2.247) 
8.011 
(2.420) 
4.558 
(0.598) 
0.309 
(0.084) 
0.640 
(0.069) 
1288 
(331) 
Orissa 
 
0.069 
(0.055) 
0.181 
(0.081) 
0.620 
(0.243) 
1.882 
(0.416) 
37.69 
(12.24) 
55.47 
(4.962) 
42.85 
(16.06) 
32.37 
(7.21) 
18.84 
(4.105) 
10.28 
(2.247) 
0.180 
(0.066) 
0.520 
(0.063) 
873 
(186) 
Punjab 
 
0.016 
(0.005) 
0.070 
(0.010) 
0.531 
(0.373) 
1.976 
(1.279) 
70.48 
(18.31) 
53.86 
(4.621) 
22.79 
(15.17) 
36.98 
(4.820) 
6.194 
(3.084) 
7.182 
(1.193) 
0.287 
(0.087) 
0.487 
(0.068) 
1732 
(384) 
Rajasthan 
 
0.033 
(0.012) 
0.109 
(0.029) 
3.807 
(1.048) 
11.55 
(1.440) 
45.48 
(9.303) 
51.92 
(2.288) 
34.83 
(8.114) 
28.46 
(3.052) 
15.89 
(3.381) 
8.068 
(0.810) 
0.107 
(0.033) 
0.391 
(0.078) 
786 
(137) 
Tamil Nadu 
 
0.036 
(0.015) 
0.193 
(0.038) 
0.837 
(0.377) 
4.463 
(0.957) 
67.46 
(18.49) 
68.06 
(9.791) 
25.52 
(19.08) 
24.12 
(9.266) 
6.179 
(2.003) 
3.355 
(1.059) 
0.303 
(0.082) 
0.623 
(0.053) 
1015 
(272) 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
0.027 
(0.007) 
0.073 
(0.019) 
3.941 
(1.829) 
9.135 
(3.391) 
54.09 
(13.16) 
54.67 
(4.062) 
32.32 
(11.55) 
32.43 
(6.409) 
9.648 
(3.163) 
3.763 
(0.842) 
0.129 
(0.040) 
0.419 
(0.068) 
874 
(141) 
West 
Bengal 
 
0.022 
(0.006) 
0.118 
(0.014) 
0.872 
(0.106) 
4.132 
(0.549) 
76.72 
(5.940) 
67.54 
(3.676) 
18.84 
(4.680) 
25.56 
(3.371) 
3.571 
(1.471) 
2.770 
(0.478) 
0.298 
(0.073) 
0.583 
(0.055) 
1173 
(191) 
Observation
s 
476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 476 457   457 505 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  For details about data sources and definitions see the data appendix 
 52 
Table 2.  Output and gender composition of the labor force, by class 
Indian states 1961-1991 
Dependent variable: log per capita total output 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Female-to-male managers 
 
1.43 
(7.27) 
 
1.57 
(4.44) 
 
1.61 
(4.53) 
   
 
Female-to-male workers 
    
1.00 
(3.45) 
 
1.09 
(2.71) 
 
1.08 
(3.04) 
 
Female literacy rate 
 
1.14 
(3.05) 
 
1.08 
(2.84) 
 
1.12 
(2.56) 
 
0.93 
(2.44) 
 
0.86 
(2.03) 
 
0.90 
(1.98) 
 
Male literacy rate 
 
0.14 
(0.13) 
 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
 
-0.19 
(0.20) 
 
-0.44 
(0.46) 
 
-0.46 
(0.47) 
 
Population growth 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.33) 
 
0.001 
(0.10) 
 
0.03 
(0.49) 
 
-0.04 
(0.55) 
 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
 
0.01 
(0.10) 
 
Ratio of urban to total 
population 
 
0.56 
(0.27) 
 
0.41 
(0.22) 
 
0.61 
(0.33) 
 
1.95 
(0.95) 
 
1.60 
(0.76) 
 
1.67 
(0.79) 
 
Ratio of capital to labor 
 
 
48.8 
(0.69) 
 
24 
(0.35) 
 
19.9 
(0.28) 
 
36.3 
(0.49) 
 
13.8 
(0.18) 
 
11.7 
(0.15) 
 
Scheduled tribes and scheduled 
castes population (%) 
  
-0.01 
(1.80) 
 
-0.01 
(1.49) 
  
-0.01 
(1.64) 
 
-0.01 
(1.44) 
 
Total work force 
 
 
 
 
0.01 
(0.53) 
 
0.001 
(0.36) 
  
0.002 
(0.99) 
 
0.002 
(0.84) 
 
Election dummy 
 
   
0.01 
(0.96) 
   
0.01 
(0.77) 
 
Election turnout 
 
   
-0.001 
(0.21) 
   
-0.001 
(0.05) 
 
Political competition 
 
   
0.001 
(1.08) 
   
0.001 
(0.86) 
 
State effects 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effects 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Number of observations 
 
289 
 
289 
 
288 
 
289 
 
289 
 
288 
Note: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.   See section 5 
for details about the estimation procedure.  Data sources and definitions are in the data appendix.  
  
 
 
53
Table 3.  Exogeneity of Maternity Benefits Act (1961) Instrument 
Indian states 1961-1991 
 
Dependent variable: Ratio of prosecutions launched to complaints received 
 
 OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Log real output per capita 
 
22.3 
(0.89) 
   
 
Annual pendency rates at high 
courts 
  
4.43 
(0.59) 
  
 
Expenditure on organs of the 
state 
   
-0.0005 
(0.91) 
 
 
Expenditure on administration 
services of the state 
    
1.08 
(1.02) 
 
State effects 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effects 
 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
0.28 
 
0.30 
 
0.30 
 
0.29 
 
Number of observations 
 
421 
 
319 
 
270 
 
384 
     
Notes: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.  See section 5 
for details about the estimation procedure.  Data sources and definitions are in the data appendix. 
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Table 4.  Output and instrumented gender composition of the labor force, by class - 
Indian states 1961-1991 
 Dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log total 
output 
Log total 
output 
Female-to-
male 
managers 
Female-to-
male 
workers 
 
Female-to-male managers 
 
5.13 
(2.92) 
   
 
Female-to-male workers 
  
4.93 
(3.00) 
  
 
Female literacy rate 
 
1.47 
(2.36) 
 
-0.21 
(0.22) 
 
0.04 
(0.53) 
 
0.38 
(4.46) 
 
Male literacy rate 
 
-0.67 
(0.41) 
 
-1.18 
(0.60) 
 
-0.16 
(1.09) 
 
-0.06 
(0.35) 
 
Socioeconomic controls 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Political controls 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
State effects 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
Year effects 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
 
YES 
 
Ratio of prosecutions launched 
to complaints received 
 
 
  
0.00003 
(1.96) 
 
0.00003 
(1.72) 
 
Adjusted/Centered R2 
 
0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.67 
 
0.93 
 
Number of observations 
 
244 
 
244 
 
244 
 
244 
     
Notes: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.  
Socioeconomic controls are population growth, the ratio of urban to total population, and the ratio of capital to 
labor.  Political controls are the absolute difference between the percentage of seats of the Congress party and 
its main competitor, lagged election turnout, and a dummy for an election year.  The ratio of female-to-male 
managers/workers is instrumented with the ratio of prosecutions launched to the number of complaints received 
from factories under the Maternity Benefit Act (1961).  See section 5 for details about the estimation procedure.  
Data sources and definitions are in the data appendix. 
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Table 5.  Disaggregated output and gender composition of the labor force, by class 
Indian states 1961-1991 
 
Dependent variable:  
 
log per capita agricultural 
output 
log per capita non-
agricultural output 
 OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Female-to-male managers 
 
-0.21 
(0.38) 
  
2.40 
(7.06) 
 
 
Female-to-male workers 
  
0.83 
(2.13) 
  
1.18 
(2.25) 
 
Female literacy rate 
 
-0.20 
(0.46) 
 
-0.37 
(0.90) 
 
1.73 
(2.41) 
 
1.47 
(1.88) 
 
Male literacy rate 
 
0.56 
(0.71) 
 
0.32 
(0.42) 
 
0.23 
(0.14) 
 
-0.17 
(0.10) 
 
Socioeconomic controls 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Political controls 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
State effects 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effects 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Adjusted/Centered R2 
 
0.70 
 
 
0.70 
 
 
0.93 
 
0.92 
 
Number of observations 
 
288 
 
288 
 
288 
 
288 
     
Notes: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.  
Socioeconomic controls are population growth, the ratio of urban to total population, and the ratio of capital to 
labor.  Political controls are the absolute difference between the percentage of seats of the Congress party and 
its main competitor, lagged election turnout, and a dummy for an election year. See section 5 for details about 
the estimation procedure.  Data sources and definitions are in the data appendix. 
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 VII. Appendix: PROOFS OF SOME RESULTS 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The particular function for the cutoff level of talent is as follows: 
 
1
1 1
1 1 1 1 11 1
ˆ
'( ) .
(1 ) (1 )
p p p
p h
w w a a H
T w
c H s w c s w a
σ
σ σ
α β βα
β αβ αβ β βα α
σ
α αβ β
−− −
− − −− − −−
+ +=
+ − −
 
 
All the important endogenous variables depend on the wage rate, w. After solving for the 
equilibrium wage rate, the remaining variables are endogenously determined. In particular, it can be 
checked that 0)(' >∂
∂
w
wT . QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Recall by (10) that ,p w pH H≤ , as long as 
1
p pa Hw
σ
σ
−
≤ , because higher wages mean incentives for 
the worker to invest more in primary education. There are two possibilities: 
In the first case, workers are in the range where ,p w pH H< . In this case, discrimination 
lowers the primary human capital of workers. Since some males are entrepreneurs, they will still go 
through the whole primary schooling process; as a result, the average primary education for males 
compared to females is 
 
,
,
p w pmales females
p p w p
N H M H
AH H AH
P
+= > = , 
 
where AH denotes average human capital and N denotes the number of workers. In this case, 
therefore, the ratio of female-to-male primary education decreases with partial discrimination. 
The second possibility is that ,p w pH H= , which was also true before discrimination because wages 
were higher. In this case, gender discrimination does not reduce the human capital of workers. 
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Moreover, workers and entrepreneurs, males and females, all go to primary school, so 
discrimination does not show up in the female-to-male ratio of primary education, but only in the 
ratio of higher education. QED 
 
VIII. Data Appendix 
We use data from sixteen Indian states over the period 1961-91. Our data base builds on Özler, Datt 
and Ravallion (1996) and Besley and Burgess (2002, 2003). In particular, state per capita net 
domestic product at current prices comes from Estimates of State Domestic Product [Department 
of Statistics, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India]. Education 
(female and male literacy rates) and population (population growth, and the percentage of urban 
population to total population) measures come from Education in India [Ministry of Education, 
Government of India] and Selected educational statistics [Ministry of Education, Government of 
India] and from the Census of India (General Economic Tables, Socio-Cultural Tables). Both 
education and population measures correspond to census issues for 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991, and 
have been interpolated between census years.  Data on capital stock (productive capital) come from 
the Annual Survey of Industries [Central Statistical Office, Industrial Planning Wing, Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Programme Implementation, Government of India].  Data on 
politics— political competition (the absolute difference between the percentage of seats occupied 
by the Congress party and its main competitor), election turnout (percentage of electors who voted), 
and information on election years, are calculated from figures in Butler et al. (1995). 
 
The quality of the judiciary (in particular high courts) is measured by annual pendency rates, 
where the pendency rate is constructed by Besley and Burgess (2003) by adding the number of 
cases pending at the beginning of the year to cases filed in the year and dividing this by cases 
resolved during the year. 
 
The gender composition of the labor force figures come from the Census of India 1961, 1971, 1981 
and 1991 (General Economic Tables), where we find data on four classes of worker: employers, 
employees, single workers, and family workers, which we interpolate between census years. We use 
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the first category as it is and then define total workers as the sum of the four. There are however 
some changes of definitions in the census over the years. 
 
In the census issues of 1961 and 1971, the population was divided into either workers or non-
workers. A worker is a person whose main activity was participation in any economically 
productive work by his physical or mental activity. In the case of regular employment in any trade, 
profession, service, business or commerce, the criterion of work was satisfied if the person had been 
employed during any 15 days preceding the day on which he was enumerated. This is somewhat 
different in the census of 1971 since the reference period is a week. 
 
In the census issues of 1981 and 1991, population is instead divided into main workers, marginal 
workers, and non-workers. A main (marginal) worker is defined as a person whose main activity 
was participation in any economically productive work by his physical or mental activities and who 
had worked for 183 days or more (less than 183 days).  For the 1991 issue, we then use the sum of 
main and marginal workers, so that the same information as in census 1961 and 1971 is used. 
However, information on the class of worker is only available in the 1981 issue for main workers. 
Marginal workers typically reflect a very small percentage of total workers, so we do not expect 
this to affect results in a significant way. 
 
Definitions of every class of worker are as follows. An employer is “a person who had necessarily 
to employ other persons in order to carry on the business from which he served his likelihood.” In 
that sense, “if a person employed a cook or other person for domestic service, he was not to be 
recorded as employer merely for that reason.” An employee is “a person who ordinarily worked 
under some other person for a salary or a wage in cash or in kind as a means of earning a 
likelihood.”  A single worker is “a person who is doing her/his job without employing others except 
casually, and without the help of other members of the family except casually and a participant in 
work as member of co-operative.” Finally, a family worker is “a person who is doing her/his work 
in a family enterprise along with the other members of the family without wages or salary in cash or 
kind.” 
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To make sure it is not the interpolated data that generates our results, we run two respective basic 
regressions with only the non-interpolated employment data (see appendix Tables A1 and A2). 
 
Annual data on maternity benefits, in particular the number of complaints received under the 
Maternity Benefits Act (1961) and the respective number of prosecutions launched are taken from 
the Indian Labour Year Book [Labour Bureau, Ministry of Labour], years 1962-92. Due to data 
availability, the data used in this study refer to women employees in factories only. 
 
Women who work in factories, mines, plantations, performance establishments and shops with 
more than 10 employees and who have worked in an establishment for 80 days in the 12 months 
immediately preceding the day of her delivery are entitled to receive maternity benefit. The Act 
establishes that payment consists of 12 weeks paid maternity leave, and 6 weeks paid leave in 
relation to miscarriage or termination of pregnancy. The maternity benefit consists of payment at 
the rate of average daily wage for the period of actual absence. In addition, a woman is entitled to 
prescribed medical bonus if no free-natal/post-natal care is provided by the employer.34 The Act 
does not apply to employees covered by the Employees’ State Insurance Act (1948). The 
administration of the Maternity Benefits Act in States is the responsibility of the Factory 
Inspectorates, who are constituted by the appropriate State Governments and are in charge of 
administering the Factories Act (1948). Factory Inspectorates then appoint inspectors, who possess 
wide powers such as entry into the factory, inspection of premises, plant and machinery, making 
on-the-spot enquiries, requiring production of documents, etc., for effective enforcement of the acts 
(Indian Labour Year Book 1963, Chapter 9, Labour Legislation). 
 
The Maternity Benefits Act specifies the power of inspectors regarding direct payments and 
complaints and prosecutions in section 17 ((Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice): 
17. Power of Inspector to direct payments to be made: 
(1) Any woman claiming that 
                                                 
34 India’s First Report, Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). 
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(a) maternity benefit or any other amount to which she is entitled under this Act and any 
person claiming that payment due under section 7 has been improperly withheld; 
(b) her employer has discharged or dismissed her during or on account of her absence 
from work in accordance with the provisions of this Act, may make a complaint to the Inspector. 
(2) The Inspector may, of his own motion or on receipt of a complaint referred to in sub-section (1), 
make an inquiry or cause an inquiry to be made and if satisfied that 
  (a) payment has been wrongfully withheld, may direct the payment to be made in 
accordance with his orders; 
(b) she has been discharged or dismissed during or on account of her absence from work 
in accordance with the provisions of this Act, may pass such orders as are just and proper 
according to the circumstances of the case. 
  
 
 
61
Appendix Table A1.  Output and gender composition of the labor force, by class 
Indian states 1961-1991 – Non-interpolated data 
 
Notes: robust t-statistics in parentheses. A constant term, state fixed-effects and a year trend are included in all 
regressions.  The corresponding regressor is instrumented with the number of prosecutions launched relative to 
the number of complaints received under the Maternity Benefits Act (1961).  See section 5 for more details 
about the estimation procedure.  Data sources and definitions are in the data appendix. 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A2.  Disaggregated output and gender composition of the labor force, 
by class 
Indian states 1961-1991 – Non-interpolated data 
 
Notes: robust t-statistics in parentheses.  A constant term, state fixed-effects and a year trend are included in all 
regressions.   See section 5 for more details about the estimation procedure.  Data sources and definitions are in 
the data appendix. 
Dependent variable: log per capita total output 
 
 Fixed-Effects Fixed-Effects IV 
 
Female-to-male managers 
 
3.01 
(2.41) 
  
9.59 
(2.72) 
 
 
Female-to-male workers 
  
1.56 
(3.74) 
  
2.47 
(11.2) 
 
Number of observations 
 
60 
 
59 
  
 
51 
 
50 
Dependent variable: log per capita agricultural 
output 
log per capita non-agricultural 
output 
 Fixed-Effects 
 
Female-to-male managers 
 
1.82 
(1.43) 
  
3.54 
(2.82) 
 
 
Female-to-male workers 
  
0.93 
(1.95) 
  
1.92 
(4.04) 
 
Number of observations 
 
60 
 
59 
  
 
51 
 
50 
05
1
0
1
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
0
5
1
0
1
5
5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10
Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Gujarat
Haryana Jammu & Kashmir Karnataka Kerala
Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Orissa Punjab
Rajasthan Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh West Bengal
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
t
e
Log Total Output Per Capita
Graphs by statename
 
Figure A1.  Female labor force participation as a function of total output per 
capita, India, 1961-1991 
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Figure A2.  Ratio of female-to-male managers by state, India, 1961-1991 
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Figure A3.  Ratio of female-to-male total workers, by state, India, 1961-1991 
